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The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth
Amendment and the Power of Technological
Surveillance
Raymond Shih Ray Kut
[O]urs is a government of laws, not of men, and... we submit our-
selves to rulers only if under rules.
1
INTRODUCTION
A great challenge of constitutional law is to interpret a
document "intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."2
With respect to the Fourth Amendment 3 since the invention of
the telephone, judges and scholars have debated over how to
translate a document originally adopted with the investigative
tools of the eighteenth century in mind to the current state of
the art. For over seventy years, the tools government 4 may
employ and how they may be used to combat criminals who
have adopted "technological advances and used them to further
their felonious purposes"5 or simply to enforce laws more effi-
ciently, have turned upon the Supreme Court interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment and the scope of interests protected by
t Associate Professor of Law, Director, Institute of Law, Science &
Technology, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am indebted to Susan
Bandes, Erik Lillquist, Christopher Slobogin, Daniel Solove, and Charles Sul-
livan for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article, to the editors of the
Minnesota Law Review for their assistance and for inviting me to participate
in this symposium, and to Oded Weinstock for his capable research assistance.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
2. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause....").
4. Throughout this Article, the terms government, executive, and law
enforcement are used interchangeably unless otherwise noted.
5. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 583 (D.N.J. 2001).
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it. Today, the nine justices of the Supreme Court unanimously
agree that privacy is the principal interest protected by the
amendment. They are wrong.
The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy. This
is not to say that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do
with privacy-the amendment clearly addresses privacy, or
more precisely, the right of the people to be secure. Rather, the
amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the
people's authority over government-the people's sovereign
right to determine how and when government may intrude into
the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.6 The
amendment does so as part of the rich tapestry that is the Con-
stitution, and cannot be viewed in isolation, but must at the
very least be viewed together with the principles embodied in
the constitutional separation of powers. To paraphrase Justice
Jackson, the Fourth Amendment protects more than privacy; it
ensures that governmental invasions of individual privacy are
based upon rules established by the people, rules our rulers
must follow in order to engage in surveillance.7 Current Fourth
Amendment doctrine not only ignores this principle-lost as it
is in the effort to define reasonable expectations of privacy 8-it
subverts it. By limiting the Fourth Amendment's application to
instances in which government invades a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as defined by the courts, the Supreme Court has
shifted the authority for determining the scope of government's
investigative power from the people to judges and law enforce-
ment.
This power shift is accomplished by the way in which the
6. In this respect, the Fourth Amendment's concern for privacy is no dif-
ferent than its concern for law enforcement's use of force, coercion, or other
methods of investigation. To the extent that Fourth Amendment law has be-
come myopically focused on defining privacy as secrecy, I agree with William
Stuntz that the focus is problematic. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1016, 1016-17 (1995).
As Susan Bandes observes, the problems presented by the Supreme Courts
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence extend well beyond new technolo-
gies. Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REv.
1379 (2002). While this Article addresses the Supreme Court's treatment of
surveillance technologies, the criticisms and suggestions raised by it are
applicable to all law enforcement decisions that determine the scope of
executive power, including what investigative techniques are permissible, to
what weapons may be used to combat crime. A detailed discussion of all of
these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
7. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
8. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1326 [Vol.86:1325
THE FOUNDERS' PRIVACY
Court frames the Fourth Amendment inquiry. In determining
whether the Fourth Amendment applies, the Supreme Court
asks whether the governmental activity is considered a search
under the Constitution.9 For the most part, this inquiry loosely
examines whether the government act is equivalent to the
types of searches our nation's Founders considered problem-
atic.10 If the activity is considered equivalent then it is treated
as a search, and according to the Court, the Constitution limits
governmental power by imposing the requirement of a warrant
supported by probable cause.11 If the activity is not equivalent,
then government agents have unfettered discretion to engage
in the activity in question with no Fourth Amendment over-
sight or restraint. With respect to emerging technologies like
the FBI's Magic Lantern project, 12 the decryption of encrypted
messages, 13 or Carnivore, 14 this approach leaves open the pos-
sibility that, despite the information gathering capabilities of
these technologies, their use may not be regulated at all under
the Constitution because semantically, the Court may not con-
sider their use searches. 15 As others have noted, "[t]his ap-
proach fails to protect privacy rights, and permits their gradual
decay with each improved technological advance."16
Moreover, in engaging in this semantic game, the Supreme
Court's current Fourth Amendment doctrine allows govern-
ment to determine for itself the scope of its own powers. This is
accomplished by assuming that law enforcement has the inher-
9. See infra Part H. For the seminal discussion of Fourth Amendment
law after Katz, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
10. See infra Part II.
11. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
12. Magic Lantern is an FBI project designed to implant recording soft-
ware into computers through the Internet using the same techniques and vul-
nerabilities exploited by hackers. See infra Part HA1.
13. Encryption is the process of converting a file into an unreadable form
for the purpose of protecting the confidentiality of the content. Decryption is
the process of translating the encrypted message into a comprehendible for-
mat. See infra Part Il.A.2.
14. Carnivore is a government device programmed to capture information
being delivered by an Internet service provider. See infra Part II.A.3.
15. See infra Part II.
16. Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of
the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance,
39 SYRACuSE L. REV. 647, 650 (1988); see also David E. Steinberg, Making
Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 (1990) (criticizing
the incoherence of the Supreme Court's sense-enhanced search cases and sug-
gesting three factors that may better protect Fourth Amendment privacy).
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ent power to adopt and utilize new technologies subject only to
narrow Fourth Amendment protections for privacy,17 and
unless a search invades a recognizable privacy interest, the
amendment places no limits upon government's ability to con-
duct that search. In many instances this means that law en-
forcement, including individual officers, is not bound by any le-
gal or constitutional restraints in deciding what surveillance
devices to use, as well as when and how to use them. In the
abstract, allowing the government to obtain a suspect's secret
password, to decipher encoded messages, or to monitor e-mail
traffic may not trouble the casual observer. After all, these
tools may not only make government's job easier; in some in-
stances they may be essential to combat technologically sophis-
ticated criminals. When interpreting the Constitution, how-
ever, the judicial function is not to balance the relative value or
efficacy of such tools against the corresponding loss of privacy
and cost to society, but to determine whether the people have
made such a decision either in the Constitution itself or by con-
ferring upon their representatives the decisionmaking author-
ity to conduct such a balancing. By leaving the decision to
adopt new surveillance technologies largely to the discretion of
law enforcement, the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence
largely stands the amendment on its head.
Current doctrine also raises grave concerns about the fun-
damental relationship between the amendment and the Consti-
tution's separation of powers. As the Supreme Court made
clear in its landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, the executive branch of government does not make
the law or determine the scope of its power, but rather enforces
the laws with the powers and means delegated to it by the Con-
stitution or by statute.'8 By removing entire categories of
searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the Court eviscer-
ates what is often the only limitation upon law enforcement
17. As I have discussed elsewhere, in a constitutional regime based upon
the principles of popular sovereignty, assuming that government has a par-
ticular power in the process of determining whether the constitution then pro-
vides certain exceptions to those powers is a serious problem in constitutional
interpretation, and is quite apparent in modern substantive due process
analysis. See generally Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the
Limits of State Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that the
way in which the substantive due process inquiry is framed incorrectly as-
sumes that the power to regulate morality qua morality has been entrusted to
government by the sovereign people).
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952).
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power. The absence of Fourth Amendment safeguards raises
serious separation of powers concerns given that executive
branch decisions to adopt and implement new surveillance
technologies are often made without express legislative or con-
stitutional authorization. 19 For the purposes of this discussion,
this Article assumes that the presence of Fourth Amendment
safeguards at least mitigates these concerns by placing consti-
tutional limits upon government use of such technologies even
in the absence of legislative or constitutional authorization.
This assumption cannot be made, however, in the absence of
Fourth Amendment protection.
All, however, is not lost. The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Kyllo v. United States20 may be a step in the right direc-
tion out of a jurisprudence mired in defining privacy. In decid-
ing that the government's use of thermal imaging equipment
without a warrant was unlawful, Justice Scalia concludes that
when a technology is "not in general public use," the Court
should "assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."2 In other words, instead of asking whether the
Founders would have considered the act in question a search,
the Court should ask whether the Founders enjoyed this level
of security from government surveillance and harassment. By
grounding the analysis in the privacy enjoyed by the Founders,
Kyllo has the potential to return the Fourth Amendment to its
proper role, not because its definition of privacy is superior, but
because it would subject all searches assisted by new technolo-
gies to the amendment's restraints. Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, Kyllo suggests that government use of new technologies
should always be subject to the warrant requirement unless
they are in general public use. Consequently, law enforcement
would need probable cause and a warrant before it could use
technologies like Magic Lantern, decryption, or Carnivore.22
If the Supreme Court follows this interpretation of Kyllo, it
would be a significant step toward reconciling the Fourth
19. My suggestion that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted as
part of the doctrine of separation of powers is similar to John Hart Ely's ar-
gument that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted as part of the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 96-97, 172-73
(1980).
20. 533 U.S. 27, (2001).
21. Id. at 34.
22. See infra Part II.A.
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Amendment with the doctrine of separation of powers, and re-
turning the decision-making authority over the appropriate
level of privacy and security in our society to "the people."23
This is true in two respects. First, to the extent that the Su-
preme Court continues to pay lip service to its holding that a
warrant is required for every search or seizure to be considered
reasonable,24 Kyllo keeps the already significant number of ex-
ceptions from growing even further and swallowing the rule.
The "people's will" is then obeyed by adherence to their will as
expressed in the Warrant Clause. Central to this interpreta-
tion is the elimination of Kyllo's "general public use" exception
or defining the exception narrowly to ensure only the public as
a whole adequately appreciates the threat of such technology
and that subsequent governmental decisions to trade off pri-
vacy for effective law enforcement are made considering every-
one's interests equally. 25
Second, to the extent that this approach raises concerns
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a per se warrant
rule, and the Court is asked to expand its interpretation of rea-
sonableness, which I described as the radical thesis, reason-
ableness should only include uses of surveillance technologies
authorized by statute. In turn these statutes should be subject
to judicial review to determine whether they include constitu-
tionally adequate safeguards that substitute for a warrant.
This approach would provide at least some assurance that the
people rather than some of their least accountable agents de-
termine the appropriate level of privacy and security in society
and requires the Court to take seriously its representation-
reinforcing role. Under this interpretation, the Fourth
Amendment would permit only those uses of surveillance tech-
nologies that the people as a whole have deemed appropriate
based upon the Warrant Clause, or those uses for which the
people's politically accountable representatives have balanced,
ex ante, the various privacy interests with the needs of law en-
forcement.
It should be apparent that this Article does not attempt to
answer the riddle of when any particular search assisted by
technology should be considered reasonable under the Fourth
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
25. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 94-95 (1988).
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Amendment, which I describe as a micro-level inquiry.26
Rather, this Article contends that we must engage in a macro-
level inquiry asking the antecedent question-whether gov-
ernment has the power to use a particular technology to assist
surveillance at all. No one questions whether law enforcement
may use eyes, ears, hands, and minds to combat crime. Nor do
we generally question that government should have the power
to pull over vehicles that violate traffic laws, stop suspects on
public streets, or break open doors. These are the tools of the
physical world, and law enforcement could not function without
them. With respect to these searches, the Fourth Amendment
requires courts to determine whether government's focus and
treatment of a particular subject was justified given the cir-
cumstances.27 The use of emerging technologies for gathering
information, however, is an altogether different inquiry. Cases
evaluating the use of surveillance technologies determine the
substantive level of privacy and security of society in general,
not simply whether the government's investigation of a particu-
lar individual was reasonable. From Carnivore to thermal im-
aging,28 the decision to allow law enforcement to use emerging
surveillance technologies is effectively a decision to expand
government power at the expense of the public's privacy and
security. In a constitutional democracy based upon the princi-
ple of popular sovereignty, we may legitimately question the
source of such power.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history and ori-
gins of the Fourth Amendment and its relationship to the doc-
trine of separation of powers. Part I argues that the central
purpose of the amendment was not to define various aspects of
life as private, but to guarantee that the people defined the lim-
its of the executive's surveillance power. Part II then examines
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dealing
26. For an excellent discussion of the problems raised by Kyllo with re-
spect to micro-level decisions see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms
and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Techno-
logical Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393 (2002).
27. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 553 (1992) ("In the typical Fourth
Amendment case, a police officer has searched an individual or his belongings
for evidence of crime. The law governing such searches is a good deal like neg-
ligence doctrine: the reasonableness of the government's action is a function of
the probable gain from the intrusion weighed against the likely loss to the in-
dividual.... ").
28. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1475-1500 (2000) (describing various surveillance technologies).
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with technology prior to Kyllo, and the problems associated
with this jurisprudence. Part II argues that the Supreme
Court's framing of the privacy question as whether a new
search is equivalent to the searches the Founders feared not
only fails to provide law enforcement with any guidance, but
supplants the decisionmaking authority of the people in part by
failing to distinguish between macro-level decisions and micro-
level decisions. In this discussion, Part II uses as examples
three emerging investigative technologies: Magic Lantern, de-
cryption, and Carnivore. In Part III, this Article discusses the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyllo and how it might sug-
gest an alternative Fourth Amendment analysis based upon
the Founders' privacy. This analysis is then applied to the
three examples discussed in Part II. Part IV argues that unlike
the Supreme Court's current approach, an analysis based upon
the Founders' privacy may be consistent with the principles of
constitutional self-governance and reconcile the current tension
between the Fourth Amendment and the constitutional doc-
trine of separation of powers. Part V.A discusses the moderate
thesis, and Part lV.B the radical thesis.
I. RESPONDING TO UNBRIDLED DISCRETION AND
POWER
To place the difficulties with the Supreme Court's current
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in context, a summary
of the amendment's history and origins is necessary.29 A brief
review of the historical foundations of the amendment reveals
that, while privacy in terms of the sanctity of home and papers
was a concern prior to the amendment's adoption, the overarch-
ing concern was unfettered governmental power and discretion,
and that "the people" played a prominent role in defining the
scope of government power and limiting its exercise. 30 In light
of this pre-constitutional history, the Fourth Amendment can
be appreciated for what it is-an outgrowth and complement to
the limitations placed upon executive power through the Con-
29. For more detailed discussions of the Amendment's history and origins
see, for example, AKHhL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (1937); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995).
30. See supra note 29.
1332 [Vol.86:1325
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stitution's separation of powers.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE FOUNDERS' CONCERNS
According to conventional wisdom, the Fourth Amendment
embodies the Founders' concerns over general warrants and
writs of assistance as illustrated by three pre-constitutional
search and seizure cases: 31 Wilkes v. Wood,32 Entick v. Carring-
ton,33 and the Writs of Assistance Case. 34 These decisions are
important because of two connecting themes: concern about the
privacy of an individual's home and papers against the gov-
ernment and fear of unbridled official power and discretion.
3 5
For example, the Wilkes case arose in response to efforts to
punish John Wilkes, a well-known member of Parliament, for
seditious libel as the author of a series of anonymously pub-
lished pamphlets called The North Briton, including a pam-
phlet, Number 45, critical of King George 111.36 Lord Halifax,
the British Secretary of State, issued a warrant that did not
name Wilkes or any other individual by name, but instead, di-
rected officials "to make strict and diligent search for the au-
thors, printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable
paper" and "to apprehend and seize, together with their pa-
pers."37 The officials carrying out the warrant arrested Wilkes
and forty-nine other suspects by breaking into their homes and
seizing their personal papers. 38
31. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (noting
that the "wellknown historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment" was "di-
rected against general warrants and writs of assistance). While there is some
debate over the relative importance of the writs of assistance, compare AMAR,
supra note 29, at 66 n.* (arguing that the writ of assistance case played "very
little role in the discussions leading up to the Fourth Amendment") with Tracy
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 223-28 (1993) (arguing that the disputes over writs of assistance
played an important role in colonial understanding of unreasonable searches
and seizures). Because my argument does not depend upon the proper resolu-
tion of this debate, I will include the Writs of Assistance Case in this discus-
sion. See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 396 n.9 (treating the Writs of Assistance
Case as part of the Fourth Amendment canon despite this debate).
32. 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (K.B. 1763).
33. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (MB. 1765).
34. See M.H. SMI-I, THE WliTs OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
35. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399-400, 406-08 (identifying the two themes
connecting these cases as privacy and unbridled official discretion).
36. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1159-61.
37. The Case of John Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 982, 982 (KB.
1763).
38. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399.
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In response, Wilkes and several of the other suspects chal-
lenged their arrest by bringing trespass actions against the of-
ficials involved. In Wilkes v. Wood, Chief Justice Pratt in-
structed the jury that
[tihe defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons'
houses, break opon escrutores, seize their papers,... upon a general
warrant. .. , and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers
to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a
power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate
this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every
man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.39
The jury found for Wilkes, awarding him one thousand pounds
in damage,40 and in a separate suit against Lord Halifax,
Wilkes was awarded an additional four thousand pounds.41 As
William Stuntz notes, the cases arising out of these arrests
"stand for the proposition that [general] warrants are inva-
lid.., and that arrests must be grounded in some cause to sus-
pect the arrestee personally of a crime."42 To the extent that
the Wilkes decision influenced the Founders, it suggests that
the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a means of restraining
official discretion. As the Chief Justice emphasized in his jury
instruction, the question raised by the case is whether anyone
in government has the power to search "wherever their suspi-
cions may chance fall."43
The concern over official discretion was similarly echoed
with respect to writs of assistance. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, British statutes gave customs officials
virtually unlimited authority to search for and seize goods in
violation of existing trade rules." These writs of assistance did
not grant the authority to search; "rather, they enabled cus-
toms officers to compel others--constables, local officials, or
39. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167.
40. Id. at 1168.
41. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399.
42. Id. at 400; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (not-
ing that the prohibition of general warrants was one of the central purposes of
the Fourth Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980)
(stating a similar proposition).
43. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167.
44. For example, the Act of Frauds of 1662 authorized customs officers "to
enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, or other
Place, and in Case of Resistance, to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and
other Package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or
Merchandize whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." Act of Frauds § 5(2)
(1662), reprinted in SMITH, supra note 34, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
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even private citizens-to assist in carrying out the necessary
searches and seizures."45 Nonetheless, as Stuntz notes, be-
cause they permitted searches based only upon the suspicion of
the customs officer, "the writs became wrapped up with the
search authority they sought to confirm."46 As another com-
mentator observes, much like the general warrant, "[tihe odi-
ous features of writs of assistance were the unbridled discretion
given public officials to choose targets of the searches," and "the
arbitrary invasion of homes and offices to execute the writs."47
This concern over discretion was clearly a central argu-
ment in James Otis's argument against the writs. According to
Otis,
A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared
legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers
may enter our houses when they please-we are commanded to per-
mit their entry-their menial servants may enter-may break locks,
bars and every thing in their way-and whether they break through
malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion
without oath is sufficient.
48
Even though Otis's argument lost, John Adams later described
his argument as "the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary
Claims of Great Britain."49 While Otis rhetorically invokes the
right of privacy with his reference to the sanctity of the home,
this right is clearly not absolute. The home is considered a cas-
tle only so long as the individual is "quiet" in it. This conces-
sion is quite appropriate and reasonable. Aside from question-
ing the validity of the underlying substantive crime, it is
difficult to imagine any value that would justify an absolute
right to hide evidence of a crime. 50 Accordingly, the problem
with the writs was not the invasion of the castle, which is how
privacy is commonly conceived, but with the process justifying
45. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 405.
46. Id.
47. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things:
Regulation of Government Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483,
1487 (1979).
48. James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 34, at 344. Put
another way, the writs place "the liberty of man in the hands of every petty
officer." Id. at 331.
49. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965) (letter to William Tudor (March 29, 1817).
50. As Professor Stuntz has argued, Wilkes and Entick were essentially
First Amendment cases in a regime in which there was not opportunity for di-
rect substantive review. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 403.
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the invasion. The writs gave customs officers and their "menial
servants" the right to enter any home whenever they pleased.
The "liberty" Otis so eloquently argued for was not an absolute
right of privacy, however defined. Instead, his liberty is the
liberty recognized in Wilkes, freedom from arbitrary and unfet-
tered government power.
The relative importance of limiting governmental power
and discretion versus defining what is private is apparent when
one considers that only one of the cases in the triumvirate
turned on an absolute right to keep information from the gov-
ernment. Like Wilkes, John Entick authored a series of pam-
phlets that authorities considered libelous.51 Once again, Lord
Halifax issued a warrant authorizing the Crown's agents to
seize Entick and his papers. 52 Unlike Wilkes, this was not a
general warrant because Entick was specifically named. None-
theless, Entick sued in trespass and was awarded three hun-
dred pounds.53 In upholding the jury's verdict, Pratt, now Lord
Camden, concluded that "[p]apers are the owner's goods and
chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from en-
during a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection."54
Despite the fact that the government had obtained a valid war-
rant, the court concluded that searching and seizing of papers
themselves was impermissible. This conclusion was to be ech-
oed in American constitutional law in Boyd v. United States,55
in which the Supreme Court held that one's papers are pro-
tected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 56
While the decision in Entick clearly recognizes the private
nature of papers, most of Pratt's decision is spent questioning
the authority and process by which the warrant was issued. In
affirming the trespass verdict, Entick rejected the power and
authority of the Secretary to issue a lawful warrant as well as
the lawfulness of the process by which the warrant was issued
and executedY. Criticizing the power of the Secretary of State
as "pretty singular,"58 he rejected the idea that the Secretary of
State had the power to issue warrants that could not be chal-
51. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howel's State Trials 1029, 1031 (K.B. 1765).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1036.
54. Id. at 1066.
55. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
56. Id. at 634-35.
57. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1045.
58. Id.
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lenged and reviewed by the judiciary,59 or immunize its issuer
and agents from subsequent prosecution.60 According to Pratt,
the laws of England did not grant the Secretary such power.61
Instead, the Secretary's claim "stands upon a very poor founda-
tion, being in truth no more than a conjecture of law without
authority to support it." 62 Similarly, Pratt considered the war-
rant unlawful because, even assuming that it was supported by
oath, it was executed ex parte, without notice or a chance to be
heard, upon unknown information and informants, and its exe-
cution did not have to occur in the presence of a constable or
the party.63 These procedures were especially troubling be-
cause, if such a warrant were issued and executed against an
innocent party,
he is as destitute of remedy as the guilty: and the whole transaction is
so guarded against discovery, that if the officer should be disposed to
carry off a bank-bill, he may do it with impunity, since there is no
man capable of proving either the taker or the thing taken.
64
Fear of government power and discretion, therefore, runs
through even the most privacy-centric decision.
It should be apparent from the Founder's concerns over
general warrants and writs of assistance that a primary goal of
the Fourth Amendment is the same as that of the entire Con-
stitution-to define and limit governmental power. While the
sanctity of one's home and papers, 65 as well as public disagree-
ment with the substantive offenses, 66 clearly played an impor-
tant role in these early cases, fear of unfettered governmental
power resonates even more clearly. Moreover, to the extent the
house and papers are to be protected, the text of the amend-
59. See id. at 1045-59.
60. See id. at 1059-62.
61. See id. at 1057 ("The whole body of the law, if I may use the phrase,
were as ignorant at that time of a privy counsellor's right to commit in the
case of a libel, as the whole body of privy counselors are at this day.").
62. Id. at 1053.
63. Id. at 1064-66.
64. Id. at 1065.
65. For example, in the Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis argued that
"[a] man's house is his castle." James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMITH, supra
note 34, at 344. In Entick, Pratt argued that "[plapers are the owner's goods
and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a sei-
zure, that they will hardly bear an inspection." Entick, 19 Howell's State Tri-
als at 1066.
66. See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 406-07 (arguing that the response to
these decisions can be explained by public opposition to the underlying
charges and offenses).
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ment and its history suggest that the protection flows from re-
straining governmental discretion even when that discretion is
specifically granted by statute. As Akhil Reed Amar suggests,
the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is concerned with the
agency problem, that is "protecting the people generally from
self-interested government."67 The amendment affords this pro-
tection not by defining what is private, but by expressly limit-
ing government's power to conduct searches. Accordingly,
searches must be reasonable, and warrants may only issue
when supported by probable cause. 68
For the purpose of this discussion, this history is also im-
portant because of what it suggests about how government dis-
cretion and power might be limited. While the Fourth Amend-
ment speaks of the reasonableness of searches and the issuing
of warrants except upon probable cause in the disjunctive, the
Supreme Court has collapsed the two requirements, creating a
general rule that warrantless searches are per se unreason-
able.6 9 As Part II discusses, under this approach, the Supreme
Court has made itself the principal arbiter of which govern-
ment acts are or are not reasonable. This interpretation of the
amendment is certainly not compelled by its history and ori-
gins.70 Instead, the Founders believed that "the people" and
not judges were to "protect both individual persons and the col-
lective people against a possibly unrepresentative and self-
serving officialdom."71
The people exercised considerable power in these pre-
constitutional cases because juries, not judges, determined the
reasonableness of a search. As evidenced by Wilkes and Entick,
the people would have an opportunity to evaluate searches in a
common-law action for trespass. As such, "a jury, guided by a
judge in a public trial and able to hear arguments from both
sides of the case, could typically assess the reasonableness of
government action in an aiter-the-fact tort suit.' 72 As Amar
67. AMAR, supra note 29, at 67-68.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972) (noting that "the definition of'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on
the more specific commands of the Warrant Clause"); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); AMAR, supra note 29, at 68 (noting that "[tihe mod-
ern Supreme Court has intentionally collapsed the two requirements");
Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 358.
70. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 64-77.
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 70.
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has argued in light of this background, it is not hard to imagine
that "the people" were to play a similar role in restraining gov-
ernmental power under the Fourth Amendment.73 Large civil
verdicts against the government agents conducting a search
would deter similar behavior in the future. Moreover, once a
jury concludes that the search is unreasonable, the search
would be considered unlawful by definition under the Fourth
Amendment. 74
Under this regime, warrants were undesirable "pro-
government" tools. 75 A lawful warrant effectively immunized
the government agent from liability,76 and removed the legality
of the search from the decisionmaking authority of the civil
jury.77 Warrants, therefore, were generally disfavored and
viewed with hostility, which explains why the Fourth Amend-
ment circumscribes rather than encourages their use.78 As
Stuntz argues, this hostility stems from the fact that warrants
"transferred the issue of the legality of the search from the
jury... to a judge or executive official..., acting both ex parte
and ex ante." 79 Hostility to warrants represented hostility to
this shift in power. 80 As Amar documents in The Bill of Rights,
throughout the ratifying debates, the Founders expressed their
belief that this power was best entrusted in the people as rep-
resented by the institution of the jury rather than the judici-
ary.81 As one essay at the time argued, if an officer searching
73. Id. ("We can now see the Fourth Amendment with new eyes.").
74. Id. ("If the properly instructed jury deemed the search unreasonable,
the plain words of the Fourth Amendment would render the search unlaw-
ful.").
75. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410 ("Warrants were a pro-government tool,
not a protection for the citizenry.").
76. AMAR, supra note 29, at 69 ("Any lawful warrant, in effect, would com-
pel a sort of directed verdict for the defendant government official in any
subsequent lawsuit for damages."); Stuntz, supra note 29, at 409-10 ("A war-
rant provided an effective defense against a trespass claim because it estab-
lished the legality of the search, creating a kind of legal 'safe harbor.'").
77. AMAR, supra note 29, at 69; Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410.
78. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) ("Far from looking at the warrant as a protection
against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable
and oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in
line with the stringent requirements applicable to common-law warrants for
stolen goods .... ").
79. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410.
80. Id.
81. AMA, supra note 29, at 74. As Professor Amar further notes, this
also meant that state law would play a significant role in protecting individual
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for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a
woman, and searched under her shift... a trial by jury would be our
safest resource, heavy damage would at once punish the offender, and
deter others from committing the same: but what satisfaction can we
expect from a lordly [judgel always ready to protect the officers of
government against the weak and helpless citizen .. ?82
By limiting lawful warrants to only those based upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, the Fourth Amendment
protects the people's power to determine the lawfulness of a
search.8 3 By emphasizing the importance of the jury at com-
mon law, I do not intend to suggest that the jury is the only ap-
propriate body for determining the reasonableness of a search,
or even for a greater role for the jury today.8 4 Judges can and
must continue to play an important role in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment. Rather, this discussion illustrates the im-
portance the Founders placed on having such decisions en-
trusted to a popular body rather than government officials
alone.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
One of the most perplexing problems of a government of
laws and not of men is ensuring that the power wielded by the
executive branch of government, "whether wielded by a Prince
or a President, is itself governed by and answerable to the
law."8 5 Under American constitutional law, this is accom-
plished by requiring, at least in the domestic sphere, that ex-
ecutive power be governed either by the Constitution or by
statute. As Laurence Tribe notes, the rejection of an all en-
compassing inherent executive power is dictated by the princi-
ples of popular sovereignty under constitutions that vest pri-
mary responsibility for regulating domestic activities in the
legislative branch of government.86 The executive's domestic
liberties. Id. at 76.
82. Id. at 74 (quoting Essay of a Democratic Federalist, reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
84. This nation and the U.S. Constitution have undergone significant
changes since the eighteenth century including the rise of the professional po-
lice force, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that we are
a much larger and more heterogeneous community weakening the common
law jury as a safeguard.
85. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-1, at 630
(3d ed. 2000).
86. Id. § 4-2, at 636 ('The federal regulation of domestic affairs has its
constitutional origins in the people and the states, and its initiation is allo-
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role under the Constitution is best illustrated by the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube.87
In 1951, a labor dispute between steel companies and their
employees threatened steel production during the Korean War.
Believing that a work stoppage would jeopardize the war effort,
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of and run the steel mills. The steel companies ar-
gued that the President's order violated the Constitution be-
cause it was not authorized by an act of Congress or any consti-
tutional provision. In response, the President argued, inter
alia, that he had the inherent power to issue such an order or
at the very least that it was part of his power to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 8 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Black agreed with the steel companies and held that the
"President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."89 With
respect to the President's argument that the order was consis-
tent with his power to execute the laws, Black responded that
"[iln the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker."90 Instead, the Constitution limits his
role to directing that "a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress," and the Constitution does not
permit him to direct that "a presidential policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by the President."91 Because Congress did
not authorize the President's actions, a majority of the Justices
concluded that Truman's order was unconstitutional. 92
In his now famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson ar-
gued that the President claimed a power that "either has no
beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no le-
cated primarily to Congress. The limitation of congressional authority, and
the direct electoral responsibility of Congress to the people provides some as-
surance to the social institutions that created the Constitution that they would
not be devoured by it.").
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
88. Id. at 584, 587 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §3).
89. Id. at 585.
90. Id. at 587.
91. Id. at 588.
92. In fact, when it enacted the labor laws the President claimed to be en-
forcing, Congress had specifically considered and rejected the idea of giving
the President the power to seize striking facilities. See id. at 656-58 (Burton,
J., concurring).
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gal restraint."93 Recognition of such a power, he argued, would
be a step toward dictatorship, and was precisely what the
Founders hoped to avoid by limiting the President's legislative
power to recommendation and veto.94 According to Jackson,
"[w]ith all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have dis-
covered no technique for long preserving free government ex-
cept that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be
made by parliamentary deliberations."95
Similarly, quoting Brandeis, Justice Douglas argued,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the gov-
ernmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
9 6
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers protects against ar-
bitrary and unfettered executive power by requiring executive
decisions to be governed by either constitutional or statutory
law.
It should be apparent that the Fourth Amendment and the
doctrine of separation of powers share the same goal and are
intended to serve the same function. As a complement to the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Fourth Amendment may
play one of two roles. Either the amendment establishes the
minimum requirements that must be satisfied before govern-
ment may conduct a search when those searches are authorized
by statute, or it guarantees that searches are always regulated
by the Constitution even if they are not specifically authorized
by statute. Determining which of these roles is required by the
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the
remainder of the discussion assumes for the sake of argument
that the latter position accurately describes the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of separation of
powers.
This brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment's history
and its relationship to the Constitution's separation of powers
highlights two important principles. First, the Fourth
Amendment was not intended as a vehicle to define privacy;
93. Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 653, 655.
95. Id. at 655.
96. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926)).
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rather, like the rest of the Constitution in general and the doc-
trine of separation of powers in particular, it is intended to
limit executive power and discretion. Second, the only legiti-
mate authority for determining the reasonableness of any exer-
cise of governmental power is the people themselves or their
legislative representatives. As Part II demonstrates, the Su-
preme Court either has ignored or subverted these principles
when evaluating the lawfulness of technologically assisted sur-
veillance.
II. SEARCHES THE FOUNDERS FEARED
A. TECHNOLOGY AND THE EROSION OF PRIVACY
The modern Supreme Court has responded to the chal-
lenges posed by new surveillance technologies by adopting an
analytical framework that asks whether the technologically as-
sisted search is similar to the searches the Founders feared. As
Anthony Amsterdam described years ago, this approach
proceeds from the premise that the Fourth Amendment is addressed
essentially to the forcible rummagings of the English messengers and
colonial customs officers. It concedes that the amendment extends to
similar cases, identifies the relevant attributes of similarity, and ends
by asking whether the police practice now in issue is sufficiently simi-
lar to the messengers' and customs officers' rummagings in the rele-
vant regards.97
As such, the Court's approach focuses on the means employed
by government, and has been described by Melvin Gutterman
as the "means model"98 or what I choose to call "means analy-
sis." The Court's means analysis is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, focusing on the searches the Founders feared does
97. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 363.
98. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 650 ("Presently, the Court measures the
existence of Fourth Amendment privacy solely by reference to the 'means
model.'"). In contrast, at times the Court and its various justices have based
their analysis on protecting the values embodied in the Fourth Amendment
regardless of the means employed. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); see also Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 364 ("The second approach
begins by asking what concerns and judgments are implied in the decision to
establish a constitutional restriction upon a category of official activity generi-
cally described as 'searches and seizures'.. . . It then inquires whether the po-
lice practice now in issue falls within the ambit of those concerns and judg-
ments."); Gutterman, supra note 16, at 649 (describing a value model as one in
which the Court focuses on the invasion of privacy and security and not the
method for the invasion).
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little to limit government discretion or to protect individual
privacy and security. Instead, means analysis allows technol-
ogy to drive the inquiry and erode those liberties. Second,
means analysis impermissibly shifts the decisionmaking power
for defining privacy and determining the appropriate level of
security in society from the people to law enforcement and the
judiciary.
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has taken a nar-
row view of the Fourth Amendment's role in limiting govern-
ment discretion to employ novel technologies. In Olmstead v.
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the tapping of
a telephone line without a warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 99 Federal agents, investigating Olmstead for
bootlegging, tapped his home and office telephones, recording
several months' worth of conversations. °° In determining
whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Court
focused on the means employed by government and what those
means revealed. 10 1 In so doing, the Court employed a simple
syllogism. The Fourth Amendment speaks of searches that all
involve physical intrusions and lead to the seizing of material
things. The search in Olmstead did not require any physical
intrusion or seize material things because the agents tapped
into the defendants' telephones without having to trespass on
private property and recorded their conversations. 10 2 There-
fore, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to wiretapping. 10 3
Of course, the Court emphasized that this does not mean that
privacy of telephone conversations can never be protected, only
that such protection must come from Congress. 1°4 According to
Chief Justice Taft, the searches regulated by the Constitution
are only those that involve a physical trespass, and unless a
search occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 105 Taft's
99. 277 U.S. at 457-66.
100. Id. at 455-57.
101. See Gutterman, supra note 16, at 650 (describing the Supreme Court
as employing a "means" rather than a "privacy" model).
102. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (noting that there was no "actual entrance
into the private quarters of [the] defendant" or "the taking away of something
tangible. Here we have testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly
overheard.").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 465-66.
105. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), the Court narrowed
this test even further by adding the requirement that the physical intrusion
take place in a protected area.
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approach effectively limited the amendment's reach to only
those searches that immediately concerned the Founders. To
the extent that government chooses to employ new technologies
that can invade individual liberty without physical intrusion,
the Fourth Amendment would not stand in its way.
While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected Olmstead's
narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v.
United States,10 6 it did not tear down Taft's analytical frame-
work. Olmstead's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's
reference to search and seizure as words of limitation continues
to be the foundation for the Court's current doctrine. In Katz,
the Court was asked once again to examine the validity of a
wiretap. Instead of a home, however, this time the telephone
tapped was a public telephone booth.107 In holding that the
amendment protects "people, not places," the Court in Katz
adopted the general rule that "[what a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."08 Instead of determining
whether government had physically intruded into a protected
area, the central question would now be whether the individual
had a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. 109 Because Katz sought to exclude the "uninvited ear"
by closing the door to a public telephone booth, he was "entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece [would]
not be broadcast to the world."" 0 How the government de-
feated that expectation was irrelevant. Because the wiretap-
ping of the telephone booth was not authorized by "the deliber-
ate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer," it violated the
Fourth Amendment." I
While abandoning Olmstead's narrow focus on physical in-
trusions, the Katz analysis maintains Olmstead's focus on de-
106. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("Once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.").
107. Id. at 348.
108. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963)).
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termining whether government conduct should be considered a
search. If the information is exposed to the public, gathering of
that information is not a search and the Fourth Amendment
does not apply. If the information is private, then government
gathering of that information is a search requiring a warrant or
consent.112 Katz, therefore, does not reject the Olmstead in-
quiry so much as it expands the scope of that inquiry. Melvin
Gutterman has argued that Katz went further, "declaring that
a privacy value-oriented analysis should replace" the Olmstead
approach.11 3 Standing alone, I would agree with Gutterman
that logically Katz should be interpreted as employing an
analysis focused on determining privacy values rather than ex-
amining the means employed by government.
The entire thrust of the [Katz] opinion is that it is needless to ask
successively whether an individual has the kind of interest that the
fourth amendment protects and whether that interest is invaded by a
kind of governmental activity characterizable by its attributes as a
"search." Rather, a "search" is anything that invades interests pro-
tected by the amendment. 114
However, by failing to provide any real guidance or substance
to the privacy value, the opinion did not shut the door to exam-
ining means, and subsequent decisions have taken advantage
of this opening, artfully transforming the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test into a means-oriented analysis.11 5 Accord-
ingly, "[a]s long as the manner of acquiring the information
could be squeezed into the Katz terminology, the nature of the
privacy value implicated need only be minimally examined." 116
As Amsterdam recognized, simply by substituting the phrase
"government intrusion" for the finding that the government
had "violated" Katz's interests creates the "subtle suggestion
that a particular kind or sort of government activity, labeled an
'intrusion,' is necessary to trigger the [F] ourth
[A]mendment."117 Regardless of what Katz originally intended,
112. Id. at 353.
113. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 662.
114. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383.
115. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs
'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable
is infringed.') (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984));
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (2001) (describing the
Court's means analysis); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-
38 (1986) (focusing on the manner of surveillance to determine that the taking
of aerial photographs was not a search).
116. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 711.
117. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383.
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if Olmstead interpreted the Fourth Amendment's reference to
searches as limited only to those searches the Founders feared,
Katz and its progeny now interpret the Amendment as applying
only to searches analogous to those the Founders feared.
Since Katz, a multitude of factors are considered to deter-
mine whether new technologies are similar to the searches the
Founders feared. 118 These factors include 1) the nature of the
place to be observed; 2) the ease of observation; 3) the location
of the observer, including whether surveillance requires physi-
cal intrusion; 4) the nature of the object or activity observed; 5)
the availability of the technology to the general public; 6)
whether the technology enhances natural senses; and 7) the
duration and scope of the surveillance.1 9 These factors are
non-exclusive, with some weightier than others, and as the fol-
lowing discussion illustrates arguably the first and third are
the most important for technologically enhanced searches. 120
Consider the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
Knotts121 and United States v. Karo122 in which the Court con-
sidered whether using electronic tracking devices constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the police
placed a "beeper" or radio transmitter in a five-gallon drum of
chloroform. 123 Using the beeper, they were able to track the
drum from its place of purchase in Minnesota to the Knotts'
cabin in Wisconsin in which they discovered a drug labora-
tory.124 In upholding the warrantless use of the beeper, the
Supreme Court concluded that the information provided by the
beeper was no different than what the officers could have ob-
118. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 383, 390-404 (1997) (summarizing the factors from the case law);
Steinberg, supra note 16, at 583-605 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
consider 1) physical trespass; 2) the visual/aural distinction; 3) plain view
analogies; and 4) implicit consent).
119. Slobogin, supra note 118, at 390-98.
120. Some commentators have suggested that practically speaking, the Su-
preme Court is simply determining whether the search in question was rea-
sonable. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1484-85 (1985) (arguing that in many circumstances, the
Supreme Court is simply evaluating the reasonableness of the search); Stuntz,
supra note 27, at 557-62 (arguing that in the ordinary criminal case Fourth
Amendment law is analogous to the law of negligence).
121. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
122. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
123. 460 U.S. at 277.
124. Id. at 277-79.
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served visually. 125  Accordingly, "[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them in this case."126 In
contrast, government agents in Karo used a beeper to track
fifty gallons of ether not only on public roads, but also to locate
the ether within specific residences. 127 The Court began by de-
scribing private residences as "places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not au-
thorized by a warrant."128 It then held that monitoring of the
beeper within private residences violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, because it allowed the government to "obtain information
that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the
curtilage of the house."129
While outwardly these decisions follow Katz, they do so
only formalistically. Noticeably absent is any real effort to
evaluate whether electronic surveillance should be considered
the equivalent of visual surveillance or why a residence should
be treated differently than a moving vehicle. Practically, these
decisions would allow government to monitor any individual
outside of the home twenty-four hours a day without any dis-
cussion of how that monitoring might affect the individual or
what that surveillance might do to the relationship between
government and individual. 130 As Justice Brennan argued in
another case, technologically enhanced surveillance is "more
penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a
free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police
omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most effective
tools of tyranny.' 31 Instead, Knotts and Karo mechanically ap-
ply Katz's statement that government surveillance of what an
individual exposes to the public is not a search. 32
125. Id. at 282.
126. Id.
127. 468 U.S. at 708.
128. Id. at 714.
129. Id. at 715.
130. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 705.
131. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
132. In substance and spirit, Knotts and Karo are also closer to Olmstead
than Katz. By recognizing a significant distinction between the public roads
and private residences, these decisions effectively resurrect Olmstead's reli-
ance upon property interests. This trend in the doctrine is even more appar-
ent in the Court's decisions involving overflights. See California v. Ciraolo,
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Another illustration of the means approach and its formal-
istic reliance on "public exposure" can be found in Smith v.
Maryland.1 33 In Smith, a victim of a robbery received threaten-
ing and obscene telephone calls from an individual identifying
himself as the robber.134 When police subsequently identified
Smith as fitting the robber's description, they had the tele-
phone company install a pen register to record the phone num-
bers dialed by Smith.1 35 The register revealed that Smith sub-
sequently called the victim. 136 In holding that the use of the
pen register was not a search, the Court concluded that Smith
could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
numbers he dialed because his use of the phone "voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business."137 Not only was the information collected
by the pen registry more limited than that collected by wire-
taps, it did not divulge the contents of the communication. 138
Having thus exposed this information, the Court concluded
that Smith "assumed the risk" that the telephone company
might turn this information over to the police. 139 The Court
reached this conclusion by assuming away rather than examin-
ing the privacy values at stake.
While not high technology, government use of drug-sniffing
canines highlights some of the other factors considered in de-
termining whether a search has occurred. These factors have
clear implications for government use of technological tools. In
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that visual surveillance of a homeowner's
backyard was not a search despite the existence of a ten foot fence enclosing
the backyard); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986)
(holding that the use of a commercial mapping camera from an airplane was
not a search). These decisions effectively hold that, because the areas under
surveillance were visible to the flying public and because the police did not
trespass to obtain the information but instead conducted their surveillance
from a publicly accessible vantage point, the Fourth Amendment does not ap-
ply.
133. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
134. Id. at 737.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 744.
138. Id. at 741 (noting that a pen register "differs significantly from the lis-
tening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications.").
139. Id. at 744.
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United States v. Place,140 the Supreme Court held that use of a
highly trained dog to sniff for narcotics was not a search gov-
erned by the Fourth Amendment.14' In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Court characterized the dog sniff as much less intru-
sive than a typical search because it does not require the
opening of luggage or the exposure of non-contraband items. 142
Moreover, the information gathered is limited; the canine sniff
determines only whether narcotics are present. 43 According to
the Court, the focused and limited nature of this inquiry "en-
sures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the em-
barrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods."'" While the Court
opined that dog sniffs are sui generis,145 Place can be used to
exempt technologically assisted searches as well.
As the foregoing decisions demonstrate, in determining
whether the Fourth Amendment regulates government
searches, the Supreme Court asks whether a particular search
is similar to those the Founders feared. It should be apparent
that by focusing on the means employed by government in con-
ducting its investigation, this approach allows technology to
dictate the degree of privacy and security that society will en-
joy. To the extent that surveillance tools like beepers, pen reg-
isters, and drug-sniffing dogs do not raise the same or similar
privacy concerns as rummaging by colonial customs officers,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply. As illustrated by the
following three examples, new technologies are likely to erode
privacy even further.
1. Net-Wide Searches and Magic Lanterns
Today, more and more individuals own or use computers
connected with one another through the Internet. Suppose the
FBI created a program to scour all of these computers for spe-
cific files such as child pornography or copyright infringing
mp3s. 146 If the program finds the specified file, it notifies the
FBI that the information has been found and where it is lo-
140. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
141. Id. at 707 (1983).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 17
(1999).
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cated. If it finds nothing, the program erases itself. This pro-
gram would not interfere with computer operations or func-
tionalities. The owner of the computer would not even know it
was there. Would the use of the program represent a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment?
When originally popularized by Lawrence Lessig, this "net-
wide search" was merely hypothetical. Today, it is one step
closer to reality. Toward the end of 2001, the FBI confirmed
that it was developing an Internet surveillance program code-
named "Magic Lantern."147 Magic Lantern would allow the FBI
to install a program that records every keystroke on a person's
computer without the need to physically access the computer. 148
The FBI would accomplish this by using many of the same
techniques and exploiting many of the same weaknesses in
commercial software that hackers use for delivering viruses
across the Internet. 149 Magic Lantern and its predecessor, the
"Key Logger System," have been designed to respond to the
criminal and terrorist use of encryption to scramble messages
and computer files. 150 Recently, a U.S. District Court upheld
the FBI's use of the key logger system to obtain information
needed to read the computer files of an accused organized crime
figure who used a popular encryption program. 151
Arguably, especially to the uninitiated, the net-wide search
and Magic Lantern should run afoul of the Fourth Amendment
in the absence of a warrant. After all, a net-wide search could
be considered the cyber-equivalent of a general warrant, both of
them gathering information that individuals endeavor to keep
secret, and both in some sense acts of trespass. 152 Both also
give government unfettered discretion to intrude into an indi-
147. See Ted Bridis, FBI Develops Eavesdropping Tools, AP ONLINE, Nov.
22, 2001, WL 30247847; FBI Confirms MSNBC.COM Story on "Magic Lan-
tern," BUS. WIRE, Dec, 13, 2001, WL 12/13/01 Bus. Wire (reporting in both
wire service items the existence of Magic Lantern and describing the pro-
gram).
148. Bridis, supra note 147.
149. See id.
150. Cf. id. (explaining problems with using the "Key Logger System,"
which mandated a "sneak-and-peak warrant" to "attach" a "device to a com-
puter."). For a definition of encryption see infra text accompanying note 157.
151. See John P. Martin, FBI Upheld on Use of Cyber-Snoop, STAR LEDGER,
Dec. 27, 2001, at 21.
152. See, e.g., eBay v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (holding that a claim of trespass to computers is legally cognizable);
Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023-24 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (recognizing a claim of trespass to computers).
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vidual's computer without any evidence that the individual has
committed any wrongdoing. Under the Supreme Court's cur-
rent doctrine, however, it is possible for a court to conclude that
the Fourth Amendment does not govern the FBI's use of these
technologies at all. Assuming that these programs are de-
signed to capture only a limited amount of information or only
contraband information, 153 they would appear to be the cyber-
equivalent of the dog sniff in Place.154 These searches are less
intrusive than physical searches-they gather only limited in-
formation, and they minimize embarrassment and inconven-
ience. Moreover, to the extent that some members of the public
(i.e., hackers) may access the same information through the
Internet, a court may conclude that the information is not pri-
vate because individuals assume the risk that others, including
the government, may access this information once a computer
is connected to the Internet. 155
2. Encryption/Decryption
In an age in which significant amounts of information are
both transmitted and stored electronically, to what extent
should the use of encryption establish a reasonable expectation
of privacy? More specifically, must the government obtain a
warrant before it can decrypt an encrypted file? The impor-
tance of these questions cannot be overstated. As Judge
Fletcher recognized,
Whether we are surveilled by our government, by criminals, or by our
neighbors, it is fair to say that never has our ability to shield our af-
fairs from prying eyes been at such a low ebb. The availability and
use of secure encryption may offer an opportunity to reclaim some
portion of the privacy we have lost. Government efforts to control en-
cryption thus may well implicate not only the First Amendment
rights of cryptographers intent on pushing the boundaries of their
science, but also the constitutional rights of each of us as potential re-
153. This is a fairly significant assumption, and was one of the key issues
in the Scarfo investigation. The FBI refused to disclose how the key logger
system functions, and the district court ultimately concluded that the defen-
dant was only entitled to a summary of how the program functioned. See
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 580-81 (D.N.J. 2001); Martin,
supra note 151, at 21.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
155. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va.
1999) (concluding that individuals have no reasonable expectations of privacy
in their Internet IP addresses because those addresses are voluntarily exposed
to others).
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cipients of encryption's bounty. 156
In brief, encryption is the process of running a readable plain-
text message through a computer program that translates the
message according to an equation or algorithm into an unread-
able ciphertext. Decryption is the process of translating the ci-
phertext back to plaintext, which is usually accomplished by
the use of an encryption key.157 Magic Lantern is designed to
enable government to obtain encryption keys, but because en-
cryption is based upon an algorithm, it is possible to break the
encryption and decrypt the message without the key either by
figuring out the algorithm, and then translating the message
oneself, or by randomly entering information until that infor-
mation matches the key.158 For example, pig Latin is a simple
form of encryption in which English words are rearranged and
additional syllables added according to a predetermined set of
rules. It is possible of course to break or decrypt a message in
pig Latin simply by determining what the rules are or by rear-
ranging the words and syllables at random until they become a
coherent message. State of the art encryption, however, is
much more difficult to break.1 59 To the extent that it is even
possible, breaking sophisticated encryption requires the use of
supercomputers, and even those computers might take years to
unscramble the information. 160
At first glance, by rendering electronic messages undeci-
pherable, encryption would appear to create a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy because it could be the digital equivalent of
sealing correspondence in an envelope. In fact, the term enve-
lope is regularly used to describe the encryption of messages. 161
156. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308, 1309 (1999).
157. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal.
1997), affd Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999),
rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 192
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
158. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption
Create a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 529-30
(2001) (noting that since "an encryption 'key' is really just a string of O's and
1's, decryption programs generally work by trying every possible combination
until the right key happens to be found (so-called 'brute force' methods)").
159. Cf. id. at 503.
160. See id. ("Because encryption keys are in most cases impossible to
guess-trying to guess a single key could occupy a supercomputer for millions
of years-encryption offers Internet users a degree of privacy in Internet
communications that remains unequaled in the physical world.").
161. Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY
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If encryption were considered the equivalent of using a sealed
envelope, then it would appear that the Supreme Court would
require the government to obtain a warrant before it could de-
crypt messages either through the use of a key or by breaking
the encryption. 162 After all, individuals have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in sealed envelopes, and opening sealed
envelopes is considered a search. 163
Once again, though, the Supreme Court's current doctrine
leaves room for doubt. Relying upon the concepts of public ex-
posure and assumption of risk, Orin Kerr has argued that gov-
ernment efforts to decrypt messages should not be considered
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 164 According to Kerr,
once the government obtains an encrypted message, the mes-
sage itself is effectively "in plain view." 165 Encryption, there-
fore, merely affects the government's ability to understand the
message, not to access it. 166 As such, he argues that when "the
government obtains communications in a form that it does not
understand, the Fourth Amendment does not require law en-
forcement to obtain a warrant before translating the documents
into understandable English."' 67 In other words, government
decryption of a message is no different than the government's
translation of Spanish into English,168 which is not considered a
search under the Constitution. 169
TECH. L.J. 629, 672 (2000) (drawing an analogy between "envelopes for writ-
ten correspondence" and encryption).
162. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 871 (1995) (argu-
ing that encryption "is armor around a communication much like a safe is ar-
mor around a possession. A person who puts something in a safe to which
they have the only key or combination surely has both a subjective and objec-
tive reasonable expectation of privacy.").
163. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 727 (1877); United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218,248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Kerr, supra note 158, at 505; see also Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyber-
space: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communica-
tion, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1591, 1604 (1997) ("Unlike a communication hidden
by a password, an encrypted message can still be viewed, albeit in encoded
form .... [Tihe encoded message, once observed, may be decoded without im-
plicating the Fourth Amendment...
165. Kerr, supra note 158, at 520.
166. See id. at 517-20.
167. Id. at 518.
168. See id.
169. See United States v. Langoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a defendant who spoke in Spanish had no reasonable expectation
of privacy that the communication would not be translated because he know-
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3. Carnivore
Lastly, consider the government's program DCS1000-
otherwise known as "Carnivore." Carnivore is a device capable
of collecting and monitoring all online activities from e-mail to
web surfing at a particular Internet service provider (ISP).170
According to the FBI, Carnivore would be configured so that it
could return certain sought-after information. 171 It would ac-
complish this by capturing all of the information that passes
through an ISP, and then extracting only the sought-after in-
formation. 7 2 For example, if the FBI sought to determine with
whom a particular individual was corresponding via e-mail,
Carnivore could be configured to "filter out" all other informa-
tion, including the content of that individual's e-mail. 173 While
it would chew all the information that came through the Inter-
net, it would only digest the sought-after information. Carni-
vore, therefore, can be programmed to limit the information
viewed by human eyes. 174 In many respects, Carnivore is the
mirror image of the net-wide search. Instead of "going out"
onto the net to search for information, however, the device col-
lects information as it passes through one of the Internet's
many gateways. Like an information roadblock, it screens all
traffic, but pulls over only the data packets it has been pro-
grammed to capture.
Despite the fact that Carnivore effectively collects all of the
information going through an ISP and searches that informa-
tion, an argument can be made that the government would not
need a warrant or court order to unleash Carnivore. 175 Smith
suggests that because an Internet user knowingly exposes in-
formation to her ISP, she assumes the risk that the ISP may
ingly exposed his communication to others and assumed the risk that it would
be translated).
170. See Donald M. Kerr, Lab. Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Carni-
vore Diagnostic Tool, Statement for the Record, United States Senate, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congressOO/kerrO9O600.htm.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. This assumes that Carnivore does not report the contents of e-mails or
online aural communications, which would be arguably governed by Katz and
the wire tape provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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turn this information over to the government.176 If Carnivore is
programmed, for example, to capture the addresses of people
with whom an individual is corresponding via e-mail, the anal-
ogy to Smith and the capturing of telephone numbers is even
closer. Knotts could also be used to exempt the tracking of an
individual's online activities. 177 The individual exposes her web
viewing habits to more than just her ISP; they are exposed to
the various websites someone visits, the companies that gather
this information for marketing purposes, and potential hackers
as well. Arguably, web surfing is much like driving on the pub-
lic streets. Likewise, Place could be relied upon because even
though Carnivore searches all of the information at an ISP,
unless it is the sought-after information, it is not viewed by
human eyes, thus minimizing intrusion, embarrassment, and
inconvenience.178 It is possible, therefore, to argue that Carni-
vore is not similar enough to the searches the Founders feared.
As these cases and examples illustrate, as technology be-
comes more powerful and capable of gathering information
without trespassing or opening locked doors and drawers, cur-
rent Fourth Amendment law suggests that the use of surveil-
lance technology is not a search. Whether one agrees with the
results of the preceding cases or examples will depend a great
deal on how one defines privacy and how one balances the
needs of law enforcement against individual security. What-
ever one may think about the merits, by limiting the Fourth
Amendment to only those searches that are sufficiently similar
to those the Founders feared, the Supreme Court has allowed
technology to diminish the level of privacy and security we can
expect in society. While this should certainly be of some con-
cern to all of us, it is not the most troubling consequence of the
Court's current approach. Debating over the definition of pri-
vacy and whether or not a particular search invades such a
right distracts us from the fundamental power shift that has
occurred under the current interpretation of the amendment.
176. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va.
1999) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information).
177. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (using as an analogy
the fact that "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another").
178. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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B. DISCRETION AND POWER
Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, the Constitution plays only a small role in
restraining government power, and the people play virtually no
role in defining the scope of that power. The irony is, of course,
that what the Founders feared was not the invasion of privacy
per se, but how and when those invasions would occur. As Part
I discussed, the Founders were more concerned about limiting
government's power to invade any aspect of life without suffi-
cient cause than with defining what aspects of life should be off
limits to government. The Founders also believed that the peo-
ple should play a significant role in making this determination.
The Supreme Court's current approach does more than ignore
these concerns-it undermines them. As it stands, the Su-
preme Court has transformed the Fourth Amendment from a
constitutional provision delineating the scope of governmental
power generally as determined by the people into a provision
that protects only isolated pockets of interests as determined by
judges.
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment
establishes a general rule that for a search to be considered
reasonable it must be authorized by warrant. 179 Although the
Court has never seriously questioned this rule, it has spent
over a quarter of a century creating exceptions to it. 180 And,
"reading a warrant requirement into the amendment, and then
reading an elaborate set of exceptions into that warrant re-
quirement, seems more like rewriting the amendment than
reading it as written." 8 1 The Court has accomplished this feat,
as Justice Black noted, by "clever word juggling."18 2 Seizing
upon the concept of privacy as secrecy despite the fact that Katz
itself recognized that the amendment "cannot be translated
into a general constitutional 'right to privacy," and that "its
protections go further,"18 3 later Courts have narrowly defined
what constitutes a search for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment--categorically excluding certain government acts
from constitutional scrutiny. 1 84
179. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
180. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (discussing twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement).
181. AMAR, supra note 29, at 68-69.
182. Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 350.
184. See supra Part ILA.
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In contrast, in his now famous dissent in Olmstead, Justice
Brandeis took issue with what he perceived as the Court's "un-
duly literal" interpretation of the amendment. According to
Brandeis,
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the form
that evil had theretofore taken," had been necessarily simple. Force
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a gov-
ernment could directly effect self-incrimination. It could compel the
individual to testify-a compulsion effected, if need be, by torture. It
could secure possession of his papers and other articles incident to his
private life-a seizure effected, if need be, by breaking and entry ....
But "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.185
The protection afforded by the Constitution for individual liber-
ties must, Brandeis argued, change to meet the problems of the
day. 8 6 Because technology will continue to develop new and
even more powerful means for gathering information, the Court
should guarantee the "right to be let alone," the right of Ameri-
cans to be secure not only in their physical possessions, but also
"in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions."1 8 7 As such, Brandeis rejected means analysis, and ar-
gued that the protections guaranteed by the Constitution are
much broader in scope. Instead of preventing only those inva-
sions of liberty sufficiently similar to what the Founders feared,
the Court's role should be to protect individuals from all intru-
sions into the right to be let alone.188 Because wiretapping vio-
lated this liberty and was arguably an even greater invasion
than more traditional searches and seizures, he considered the
government's actions unlawful under the Fourth Amend-
ment.1
89
Except on the rare occasions when the Supreme Court rec-
ognizes a search as a search, the determination of whether gov-
ernment may use technology to engage in surveillance and how
to use that technology is left entirely to the discretion of law en-
forcement. The people play almost no role in determining the
185. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
186. See id. at 472.
187. Id. at 478.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 475-79.
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scope of government's power or whether any particular exercise
of that power is reasonable. Either the Supreme Court consid-
ers the use of technology a search requiring a warrant, or the
government's use of the technology is absolutely unrestrained
by the Constitution.190 In so doing, the Court has interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to vest the authority to determine the
appropriate level of privacy and security in this nation in an in-
stitution whose power the Founders sought to restrain. The
Justices certainly have "stood the [F]ourth [Almendment on its
head."191
Consider once again the Court's decision in Olmstead. Of-
ten overshadowed by the debate between Taft and Brandeis
over how to define privacy is their exchange over the role of the
underlying state law. In Olmstead, a state law prohibited wire-
tapping. 192 The federal officers, however, obtained the evidence
against Olmstead by violating that state law. Taft treated this
fact as irrelevant for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis,
and merely concluded that, under the common law, evidence is
admissible even if illegally obtained. 193  In contrast, both
Brandeis and Holmes believed that the prosecution should not
have been allowed to continue precisely because of the govern-
ment's misconduct. 194 Both Justices were concerned with this
abuse "on behalf of the United States,"195 and believed that the
evidence should have been excluded, 196 but neither considered
state law relevant in determining the reasonableness of the
search under the Fourth Amendment. Brandeis argued that
the case should be dismissed as a matter of equity,197 while
Holmes argued that the exclusionary rule should be applied to
violations of law in addition to violations of the Constitution. 198
In light of the role that common-law trespass played in this re-
190. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 388 ("On the other hand, if it is not
labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is subject to no significant restriction of any
kind.").
191. See TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 23-24.
192. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469.
193. See id. at 467-68.
194. See id. at 480 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
195. Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 480 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
197. See id. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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gard,199 the omission is particularly troublesome because it ig-
nores the role that both federalism and the people play in con-
trolling governmental discretion and safeguarding individual
liberty under the amendment. 2° This is not to suggest that
state law or federal statutes are the only or preferred means of
protecting individual liberty, but rather that courts should not
ignore the important role legislatures play in our tripartite
government in determining the appropriate amount of power to
be exercised by law enforcement. Laws prohibiting certain
forms or means of information gathering, therefore, should
limit executive power and define at least minimum levels of
privacy and security protected by the Fourth Amendment.201
In defense of the Justices, the adoption of this interpretive
framework may well be explained as recognition that the police
require significant discretion at what I will call the micro
level-how best to exercise power in a particular situation or to
capture a particular criminal. The police constantly deal with
danger and the unknown, and they must have the power to
protect themselves as well as the public in highly fluid situa-
tions. Likewise, through their unique experiences, officers may
develop special expertise and judgment, and society is better off
when experienced officers are allowed to follow their hunches
and target suspects to prevent a crime from occurring or to cap-
ture them after the fact. So when a suspect uses encryption to
hide her computer files, it is generally up to the police to de-
termine the best way to obtain that evidence, whether it be by
breaking into the computer and physically implanting a key
logger, using Magic Lantern over the Internet, or convincing an
accomplice to copy the files. Given that the Supreme Court de-
cides individual cases in which law enforcement's exercise of
micro-level discretion actually uncovered evidence of a crime
and led to the capture of the perpetrator, it would be difficult to
conclude that the exercise of that discretion was unreasonable
199. See supra Part I.
200. AMAR, supra note 29, at 76 ("Vindication of [Fourth Amendment] re-
strictions would largely come from state bodies. State statutes and state
common law, after all, would typically define and protect ordinary individuals'
property rights to their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects.' Thus state law
would initially create the trespass cause of action that would enable ordinary
men and women to challenge unconstitutional intrusions by federal officials."
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
201. Of course, unless passed by Congress, laws prohibiting the use of sur-
veillance technologies will vary from state to state, leaving open the possibility
that individual liberties will vary as well.
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unless it led to discriminatory harassment of individuals or se-
lective enforcement of the law.
However, we should not confuse police decisionmaking at
the micro level with macro level decisions that determine the
scope of executive power in general. While the Constitution
may permit a degree of deference at the micro level, it leaves
little room at the macro level. The decision to adopt a new form
of surveillance technology is just such a macro-level decision.
The decision to adopt Magic Lantern or Carnivore is a determi-
nation to expand the powers and capabilities of the executive
branch and correspondingly to reduce the level of privacy and
security individuals may expect and enjoy. Whatever deference
law enforcement may be entitled to with respect to micro level
discretion, it is entitled to none at the macro level. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
virtually ignores the distinction between micro and macro-level
decisionmaking, and never questions from where law enforce-
ment derives its authority to adopt these new technologies.
The Supreme Court's failure to question the source of law
enforcement's power to adopt new technologies leads to a sig-
nificant incongruity. The individual officer, a relatively low
member of the executive branch, in many respects, has more
discretionary power than the President. Unlike the President,
whose power in general must be granted either directly by the
Constitution or by acts of Congress, 202 many of the activities
the police engage in are not authorized by law at all, but are in-
stead conducted under "their broad general duties to enforce
the law and keep the peace."20 3 While the Supreme Court care-
fully scrutinizes presidential claims of inherent authority, it
appears to assume the President's inherent authority when law
enforcement is concerned. 2°4 In this respect, the Supreme
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 386; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986) ("Regulatory or enforcement authority gener-
ally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally em-
ployed or useful to execute the authority granted.").
204. One might argue that this assumption is warranted because state
constitutions do not follow the same doctrine of separation of powers as the
U.S. Constitution. While one can argue that state legislative power is broader
than congressional legislative power, there is no support for the argument that
the doctrine of separation of powers with respect to state executive power dif-
fers from the federal doctrine. As even a critic of this approach recognizes,
"federal precedent sets the terms for much state separation of powers debate,
and federal principles provide a presumptive standard for state constitutional
decisions." Robert A. Shapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separa-
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Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must learn from its
evaluation of presidential power in the Steel Seizure Case.
Unless the people grant the executive branch the power in
question either through the Constitution or through legislation,
claims of inherent executive power are suspect.205 As it stands,
under the Court's current approach, the people play absolutely
no role in determining the extent and reasonableness of gov-
ernment's power to search. Instead, the Court treats law en-
forcement as having unfettered government power to invade
individual privacy and security subject only to a few not so well
defined but limited exceptions defined by the Court. Whatever
role the Fourth Amendment might have played in regulating
executive power consistently with the doctrine of separation of
powers, in many instances it currently plays no role whatso-
ever. This state of affairs is precisely what the Founders feared
most.
III. A HEAT SOURCE AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?
The Supreme Court's most recent Fourth Amendment de-
cision involving new technology may be the first step in pre-
venting the "power of technology to shrink the realm of guaran-
teed privacy,"2°' and restoring the Fourth Amendment to its
intended role of preserving the people's authority to limit unfet-
tered government power. Kyllo v. United States arguably re-
tion of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 80 (1998); see also
People v. Moore, 102 N.E.2d 146, 151-52 (Ill. 1951) (recognizing that the doc-
trine of separation of powers only permitted the police to seize items specifi-
cally defined by state statute); Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive
Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 77
(1976) ("mhe state supreme courts have uniformly held that the legislatures
are the only branch of government possessing the power to legislate.").
205. See supra Part I.B; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1957) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the Presi-
dent's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmak-
ing process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about
who shall make laws which the President is to execute."); id. at 637-38 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) ("When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers [granted by the Constitution] .... When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb .... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclu-
sive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.").
206. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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frames the Fourth Amendment inquiry from whether the use of
a particular technology is similar to the searches the Founders
feared to whether the Founders would have enjoyed "that de-
gree of privacy against government."207 The Kyllo Court fo-
cused on the freedom from government surveillance enjoyed by
the Founders rather than on the kinds of searches that con-
cerned them. Kyllo limits the erosion of individual privacy and
security brought on by new technologies by requiring the use of
such technologies to be authorized by a warrant. More impor-
tantly, as discussed in Part IV, an approach based upon the
Founders' privacy is a positive step toward returning to the
people the authority to determine the extent and reasonable-
ness of government's surveillance power.
Suspecting that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his
home, federal agents used a thermal imaging device, the
Agema Thermovision 210, to scan Kyllo's home.20 8 Growing
marijuana indoors ordinarily requires the use of high-intensity
lamps and, like all heat sources, these lamps emit infrared ra-
diation. Thermal imagers are capable of detecting infrared ra-
diation, which is imperceptible to the human eye, and "operates
somewhat like a video camera showing heat images."2O9 The
scan of Kyllo's home revealed that the garage and a side of his
home were relatively hotter than the rest of the home and sub-
stantially warmer than his neighbors' homes.210 Based upon
the scan and other information, a warrant was issued authoriz-
ing a physical search, which resulted in the discovery of more
than one hundred marijuana plants.21 The district court up-
held the warrantless use of the device because in its estimation
the device was relatively non-intrusive--it displayed only a
crude visual image of heat, did not penetrate the walls or win-
dows of the home, and did not reveal any intimate details. 212
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia begins by question-
ing the Court's assessment of "when a search is not a
search.'2 13 Noting the disjuncture between the term "search"
as it is commonly understood and as it is applied in Fourth
Amendment law, Scalia recognized that the Court has applied
207. Id.
208. Id. at 29-30.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 31-32.
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"somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz"
holding that "a Fourth Amendment search does not occur"
unless the Court concludes that there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.214 This odd state of affairs might be explained
by the need to reconcile the common law principle that "'the eye
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass" 215 while
preserving "somewhat" the doctrine that warrantless searches
are presumptively unconstitutional. 216
The opinion then abruptly shifts to the question confront-
ing the Court, which according to the opinion is determining
the limits, if any, upon the power of police technology to "shrink
the realm of guaranteed privacy.'2 17 In defining these limits,
Scalia describes the Court's role as assuring "preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.' 18 Consistent with this
approach, the opinion holds at a minimum that searches of the
interior of the home must be considered searches under the
Constitution.219 The Court noted, "We think that obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the in-
terior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the tech-
nology in question is not in general public use.1 20 According to
Scalia, this is a "ready criterion, with roots deep in the common
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that
is acknowledged to be reasonable."221 Any other conclusion
"would... permit police technology to erode the privacy guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment."222
By focusing upon the Founders' privacy, Scalia's opinion
casts aside means analysis. At first, this rejection is implicit as
the majority reaches its conclusion without any examination of
the factors discussed in Part II or relied upon by the lower
courts. The rejection becomes explicit, however, in response to
214. Id.
215. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (quoting Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (KB. 1765)).
216. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32.
217. Id. at 34.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (citation omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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the argument of the Government and dissent that no search oc-
curred because the device detected only heat radiating outside
the house. That is, the police employed "off-the-wall" rather
than "through-the-wall surveillance. 2 23 Justice Stevens's dis-
sent is a perfect illustration of means analysis at work. Accord-
ing to Stevens, government use of the thermal imaging device
in Kyllo should not be considered a search for several reasons.2 2
First, the information was obtained from outside of the home
without physically penetrating the premises. 225 Second, a per-
son has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat ema-
nating from the home because it is exposed to the public.226
Third, the thermal imaging device did not reveal any intimate
or embarrassing information about the home. 227 In rejecting
these arguments, Scalia noted that the same analysis would
permit warrantless searches with any device that simply re-
cords information emanating from the home including powerful
microphones and satellites.228 Moreover, Scalia criticized this
type of reasoning as the same "mechanical interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment" rejected in Katz-an approach that, like
Olmstead, "leave[s] the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology. '229 Consequently, Scalia concluded that the gov-
ernment must obtain a warrant before it may use these new
technologies.2 0
As illustrated by the decision, preserving "the degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted" instead of determining whether a
search is a search dramatically alters the protection afforded by
the amendment. Rather than permitting government to ex-
pand its power to conduct surveillance because advances in
technology distance information gathering from the physical
searches of the eighteenth century, Kyllo limits government's
ability to engage in warrantless searches to those considered
reasonable at the time the amendment was adopted-most no-
tably searches conducted by the unaided senses. The use of
any technology to enhance those senses would require a war-
223. Id. at 35.
224. Id. at 41-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 43-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 35-37.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 40.
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rant until that technology is in general public use.231
Consider once again the examples of the net-wide
search/Magic Lantern, decryption, and Carnivore. As discussed
in Part II, all three of these technologies might not have been
considered searches under the means analysis. Under Kyllo
there would be no question that government use of these tech-
nologies would represent searches. Because these technologies
did not exist at the time the amendment was adopted and were
therefore incapable of invading the Founders' privacy, in order
to use them, law enforcement must first obtain a warrant. In-
stead of the hopelessly subjective analysis that typifies current
Fourth Amendment analysis, the only questions remaining for
the courts are objective: Did the police have a warrant or is the
technology in general public use? For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, I will assume that Kyllo's use of "general public use"
means what it says: The technology must actually be routinely
used by the general public and not simply available or used by
some portion of the public.232 My reasons for this assumption
are discussed in Part IV. As the general public does not yet
conduct net-wide searches, have the power to decrypt encrypted
messages, or monitor and capture Internet information flow, a
warrant would be required to authorize these searches.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo could be interpreted more
narrowly as applying only to surveillance of the interior of the
home. After all, the holding is specifically limited to the home,
231. Kyllo's approach is also preferable to the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis because it comes closer to applying the Fourth Amendment as
written and provides a clear means of determining what the amendment re-
quires. Some may criticize this approach as Olmstead in reverse, locking gov-
ernment into the surveillance technologies and techniques of the eighteenth
century. If Kyllo's holding was based on the Fourteenth Amendment and sub-
stantive due process, this criticism might be valid as Kyllo would limit gov-
ernment's powers to those that existed at the time the amendment was
adopted. The Fourth Amendment's limitations are different. Rather than ab-
solutely denying government the power to conduct searches it limits the exer-
cise of that power to circumstances in which government has probable cause.
As such, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from bene-
fiting from new technologies; it merely defines when those technologies may be
used.
232. This would appear to be consistent with the majority's conclusion that
the thermal imaging device in Kyllo was not in general public use. 533 U.S. at
34. This, despite the fact that, as the dissent points out, there are thousands
of Thermovision 210s or similar devices that were manufactured and "readily
available to the public" for purchase or rent. Id. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (citing App. at 18); see also id. at 50 n.6 (noting that thermal imaging is
not "routine").
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a "constitutionally protected area," and the security of the inte-
rior of the home figures prominently throughout the Court's
discussion and throughout this nation's history.233 Limiting
Kyllo to the interior of the home, however, would run counter to
the Court's return to the true meaning of Katz and the rejection
of mechanical interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Such
a narrow interpretation would instead return Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to Olmstead and not Katz, a result the majority
clearly wanted to avoid. Moreover, limiting Kyllo to the inte-
rior of the home does nothing to limit government power and
discretion outside of the home. While Kyllo clearly has the po-
tential to alter the Court's current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, should it be embraced? Part IV argues that
courts should apply the Kyllo analysis not because it is better
at protecting privacy or protects more privacy, but because it
preserves the right of the people to determine what powers the
government should have to engage in surveillance and when
that power should be considered reasonable.234
IV. THE PEOPLE'S POWER
Prior to Kyllo, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence had
transformed the Fourth Amendment from a provision circum-
scribing government power and discretion to one accommodat-
ing such power and discretion; only the sophistication of its
technology limited the government's power.235 This transfor-
mation occurred because the Court limited the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection to privacy and then narrowly interpreted pri-
vacy to create exceptions to the types of searches governed by
the amendment. Through this doctrine, the Court presumed
that the government could employ new surveillance technolo-
gies unless the surveillance invaded interests the Justices sub-
jectively considered private. The people's only role in the proc-
ess was to respond to government and the courts after the fact.
They were relegated to enacting legislation to limit government
233. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961)).
234. As Justice Stevens notes, Kyllo can be interpreted as under-protective
of privacy because of the general public use exception. Id. at 46-48 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In this respect, as evidenced by the general public use excep-
tion, Justice Scalia's continued reliance upon privacy suffers from some of the
same flaws as the rest of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
definition of general public use will be discussed in greater detail in Part IVA.
235. See supra Part l.
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use of technology or amending the Constitution.236 This section
outlines why the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo creates an
opportunity to return the people to their rightful position as the
primary source and arbiter of governmental power. Depending
upon how the Court determines what makes a search reason-
able under the amendment, the Supreme Court may reinforce
self-governance in two ways. If the Court maintains the per se
rule against warrantless searches, which I will describe as the
"moderate thesis," popular sovereignty is reinforced through
the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. As Part IV.A ar-
gues, this result is a perfectly reasonable and acceptable inter-
pretation of the amendment, and consistent with the principles
of constitutional self-governance. If the Court chooses to ex-
pand its interpretation of reasonableness, the "radical thesis,"
Part IV.B argues that reasonableness should only be expanded
to include surveillance technologies authorized and circum-
scribed by statute subject to judicial review. Under both of
these approaches, the people, as the Founders intended, would
determine the reasonableness of government power.
A. "WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE UNLAwFUL"---THE
MODERATE THESIS
Relying upon Kyllo, the Fourth Amendment may be inter-
preted to prohibit any government use of surveillance technol-
ogy not in general public use unless authorized by a warrant.
While this interpretation of the amendment may assign more
weight to the Warrant Clause than some believe the Founders
might have intended, 237 it nonetheless remains true to the
Fourth Amendment's ultimate purpose of protecting the peo-
ple's right to determine the reasonableness of searches. A per
se rule simply shifts the vehicle for this determination from the
common law jury to the Constitution itself.
As the discussion of the amendment's pre-constitutional
origins demonstrates, the Fourth Amendment could recognize
two methods for determining when searches are reasonable.238
Government could conduct a search without a warrant provided
that the people had the power to oversee those searches di-
rectly. Otherwise, government must obtain a warrant sup-
236. Of course, the people may even indirectly influence this process by
electing executives who promise to alter governmental practice and/or nomi-
nate judges whose views on privacy are more consistent with their own.
237. See supra Part I.
238. See supra Part I.
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ported by probable cause. Even though the Founders might
have been concerned about warrants, the Fourth Amendment
considers warrants reasonable when they are supported by
"probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."239 While a per se warrant rule eliminates
one method for determining reasonableness, a rigid adherence
to the Warrant Clause still applies the people's definition of
reasonableness as expressed in the clause. Accordingly, a per
se rule remains faithful to the amendment's purpose of ensur-
ing that the people determine when government may search.
As discussed in Part II, the problem with pre-Kyllo search and
seizure cases was not the per se warrant rule, but rather the
Court's willingness to create exceptions to the rule. By creating
exceptions to the per se rule, the Justices replaced the judg-
ment of the people with their own.
Given the importance of strictly adhering to the warrant
requirement under a per se rule, Kyllo's exception for technolo-
gies in general public use would appear inconsistent with the
right of the people. Granted, a general public-use exception
would be based upon the same underlying flaw as the Court's
earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that the amendment
protects privacy and not power, and whether members of the
public may invade our privacy does not answer the question of
whether government may. Similarly, if the Court were to in-
terpret this exception broadly, general public use could become
an exception that swallows the rule much like Katz's statement
regarding what one voluntarily exposes to the public. More-
over, as Justice Stevens argued, creating an exception for tech-
nologies in general public use seems "perverse because it seems
likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede,
as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily avail-
able."240 Perhaps, in light of these concerns, Scalia's opinion
appears to suggest that the Court may be open to reexamining
the factor.241
Despite these concerns, the exception might be acceptable
precisely because it is based upon an increased threat to pri-
vacy. If limited to only those technologies already routinely
used by the general public, the exception would apply only un-
239. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
240. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 50 n.6.
20021 1369
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
der circumstances in which the public as a whole understands
the risks and has borne the costs of such technologies. A strict
interpretation of general public use, therefore, reduces the risk
that the public will acquiesce to government use of technology
because a majority or powerful minority have not internalized
the costs of such technology, and therefore either misperceive
the relative costs and benefits or selfishly are willing to allow
others to pay them.242 If society is to rely upon legislatures to
protect against governmental invasions of privacy or security, it
is only appropriate to do so when the use of a technology is so
ubiquitous that the public as a whole appreciates its threat.
Only then can we be assured that the absence of legislative
safeguards results from the public's judgment that the threat is
acceptable rather than its lack of concern for or discrimination
against a subset of the population.
While a per se warrant requirement might be doctrinally
neater without any exceptions, the general public use exception
may very well be consistent with the common law origins of the
amendment and avoids its own unduly mechanical interpreta-
tion of the amendment.243 As Justice Scalia recognized in
Kyllo, one of the problems with interpreting the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches was the
common law conclusion that the eyes cannot be guilty of tres-
pass.244 If the police could use their eyes and ears to gather in-
formation without a warrant, then the Fourth Amendment im-
plicitly recognized at least some exceptions from the beginning.
What is important about the common law rule for natural
senses is not its pedigree or its historical existence, but rather
the reason for the exception. Natural senses are by default
surveillance tools routinely used by the general public. The
public, therefore, has always understood the threat to privacy
and security represented by these senses and has responded
242. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 25, at 95 (noting that as "the cost
of law enforcement is more widely distributed.... there is less reason to fear
that the governmental decisions to trade off privacy for law enforcement are
being made without considering everyone's interests equally").
243. This does not address the question of whether a warrant should, none-
theless, be required because of concerns over police discretion with respect to
micro-level decisions (i.e., decisions regarding when technologies should be
used to search a particular suspect). Others have identified some of the con-
cerns the public use exception creates at that level. See Slobogin, supra note
26.
244. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
628 (1886)).
1370 [37ol.86:1325
THE FOUNDERS' PRIVACY
accordingly by building walls and fences and prohibiting physi-
cal trespass. Technology should be no different. To the extent
that flashlights, cameras, and binoculars are routinely in gen-
eral public use, we become as familiar with the threats they
pose as we have with unaided sight. Likewise, we become as
capable of evaluating and responding to the technology's threat
either with privacy enhancing technology or by limiting its use
by law. While it might be reasonable to require the govern-
ment to obtain a warrant even for such technologies, interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment to require one because of macro-
level decisions could be considered unduly formalistic.
One serious objection to the general public use exception is
that formalism serves an important value in this context be-
cause government use of technology is different. To the extent
that the Fourth Amendment is truly about power rather than
privacy, the fact that citizens may invade each other's privacy
does little to answer the question of whether government
should have the same power.245 No longer slavishly focusing on
privacy, a per se warrant requirement should arguably apply to
any new technologies. While one might respond that in light of
the pervasiveness of the technology, the political process can be
trusted to do what the people think necessary, or that even the
doctrine of separation of powers recognizes that some executive
powers may be authorized through legislative acquiescence, 246
the objection nonetheless deserves serious attention.
On the other side, one might note that requiring probable
cause before law enforcement may employ an arguably less in-
trusive technological search may create a disincentive for using
those technologies. After all, why would the police use a crude
thermal imaging device if they have sufficient justification for
conducting a physical search even though the thermal imaging
device may be less intrusive and a more efficient means of ex-
cluding the innocent? In some instances, law enforcement may
choose to conduct a physical search rather than resorting to
technology; it is far from clear, however, that they will auto-
matically prefer physical searches to technological searches.
On balance, technological surveillance may often be superior to
245. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 406-07.
246. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (concluding
that Congress had implicitly authorized the practice of claim settlement by
executive agreement); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing that under some cir-
cumstances Congress may implicitly authorize executive actions).
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physical searches precisely because certain technologies may
make it possible to exclude suspects with less effort and intru-
sion than a physical search. Likewise, technological searches
may be superior to physical searches because they permit law
enforcement to gather information without alerting suspects to
the investigation. These searches reduce the risk that evidence
will be destroyed, lead to additional evidence of criminal con-
duct, and help identify additional suspects. Most importantly,
technologically assisted surveillance may allow law enforce-
ment to gather information from a safe distance without having
to expose agents to physical harm. Lastly, to the extent that
this is a subject for debate and discussion, it is either an argu-
ment against recognizing a per se rule under the Fourth
Amendment, or an argument for amending the Constitution.
From a policy perspective, supporters of effective law en-
forcement should favor this moderate thesis. First, under the
Fourth Amendment, law enforcement could adopt technology
without the need for legislative authorization. While this type
of executive action may still be suspect under general separa-
tion of powers principles, the Fourth Amendment would not
prohibit it because the warrant requirement guarantees that
the people have determined the reasonableness of the search.247
Second, obtaining a warrant is not a significant burden on law
enforcement, 248 and it brings with it a tremendous benefit-
insulating the search from subsequent constitutional chal-
lenge.249 Kyllo could become the Fourth Amendment equiva-
247. As noted at the beginning of this Article, I am assuming for purposes
of this discussion that the existence of Fourth Amendment restrictions upon
government's power to adopt surveillance technologies and to conduct searches
would satisfy separation of powers concerns. An argument could be made,
however, that reasonableness can be read as imposing obligations in addition
to those embodied in the Warrant Clause, including that a search is not rea-
sonable even if supported by a warrant if the search was not authorized by
statute.
248. Of course, one may argue that if law enforcement must have probable
cause to use arguably less intrusive technologies, they would have no reason to
do so because they would have sufficient justifications for conducting a physi-
cal search. It may be true in some instances that law enforcement may simply
choose to conduct a physical search rather than use a thermal imaging device,
Carnivore, or a tracking device. Law enforcement may, however, choose tech-
nological surveillance over physical surveillance because of the various bene-
fits derived from technological searches, including reduction in physical risk to
law enforcement and the ability to gather information without alerting the
suspect to the investigation.
249. See, e.g., Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magis-
trates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth
1372 [Vol.86:1325
THE FOUNDERS' PRIVACY
lent of Miranda warnings250 with the warrant requirement
serving as a prophylactic rule benefiting government actors
more than it limits their behavior. 251 Third, Kyllo provides
clear guidance to law enforcement on the use of surveillance
technologies, and virtually eliminates the uncertainty associ-
ated with the use of new technologies. The only uncertainty
will be at the margins when it comes to determining whether
the general public routinely uses a particular technology.
Fourth, applying the warrant requirement equally to all tech-
nologies (and arguably all search techniques) limits the poten-
tial for judicially created exceptions to encourage differential
enforcement of criminal laws.2 52 Lastly, in contrast to the radi-
cal thesis, the moderate thesis requires no changes in constitu-
tional law outside the Fourth Amendment.
B. "NOT ALL WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE UNLAwFuL"-THE
RADICAL THESIS
For decades, commentators have criticized the Supreme
Court for limiting the Fourth Amendment's definition of rea-
sonableness to warrants. 253 In particular these commentators
have argued that expanding Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness to include searches authorized and circumscribed by stat-
ute or administrative rulemaking would better serve the
amendment's goal of limiting police discretion while promoting
responsible police behavior and accountability in ways that the
Court's all or nothing approach cannot. 254 In certain areas of
Fourth Amendment law, the Court has in fact relaxed the war-
rant requirement in reliance upon statutory authorization or
Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 317 (1996) ("As a second
incentive for government agents to use warrants, the burden of production and
persuasion should be placed on the defendant if a warrant has been obtained
to show that a search or seizure is unconstitutional.").
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
251. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 554 (1996). But
see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 387, 389-91 (1996).
252. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1047.
253. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 68-69; Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 358-
59, 367-68; Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regu-
lations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 449-50, 468-70 (1990).
254. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 423-28; LaFave, supra note 253,
at 451.
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administrative rules to uphold warrantless searches2 5 Kyllo's
conclusion that the use of surveillance technologies not rou-
tinely used by the general public is a search will most likely
prompt others to argue that the Court should expand its defini-
tion of reasonableness to include warrantless searches pursu-
ant to statute and administrative rules. As Part TV.A suggests,
this expansion is not required or even desirable, but if it should
occur, government use of technology absent a warrant should
only be considered reasonable when authorized by statute sub-
ject to judicial review. Only under these circumstances would
the Fourth Amendment guarantee that the people determine
the reasonableness of government searches, and follow the
Constitution's separation of powers.256
While having law enforcement develop and implement a
process for administrative rulemaking is certainly valuable and
worthwhile regardless of its Fourth Amendment implications,
it should not be allowed to replace warrants under the amend-
ment. As discussed earlier, police decisionmaking and discre-
tion can be separated into micro level decisions and macro level
decisions. 257 Requiring the police to formulate internal rules
and policies governing searches is a significant step towards
limiting police discretion at the micro level, that is, when and
how to conduct searches. Administrative rulemaking, however,
does nothing to alleviate executive discretion at the macro level
whether law enforcement should have the power to conduct
255. See, e.g., Grifin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (upholding
state regulations authorizing probation officers to conduct warrantless
searches of probationer homes based upon "reasonable grounds"); New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of an auto-
mobile scrap yard because a "statute informs the operator of a vehicle
dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular basis"); Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspection of
coal mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act provided that the
inspection program "provideo a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant[]);Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) ("[R]easonable police
regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy
the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be
able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."). This
limited relaxation of the warrant requirement in areas outside of day-to-day
criminal investigation has been criticized as a form of privacy Lochnerism.
See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 442; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1047.
256. Of course, one could also expand reasonableness to once again recog-
nize the role of the common law jury. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 70. Doing
so, however, would require the Supreme Court to re-examine its positions on
sovereign immunity, official immunity, and habeas corpus.
257. See supra Part II.
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such searches at all. Allowing administrative rulemaking to
replace the warrant requirement would suffer from the same
fundamental problem of unbounded executive discretion pre-
Kyllo. A dialogue on reasonableness would simply replace the
dialogue on privacy with law enforcement and the judiciary
calling the shots.
In contrast, requiring the use of surveillance technologies
to be authorized by statute recognizes that the people should
determine just how much power government should wield. As
discussed earlier, popular control over government's power to
search was the driving force behind the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, requiring statutory authorization for
law enforcement's power to search-even if it is not used to de-
termine reasonableness-would bring search and seizure law in
line with the doctrine of separation of powers governing execu-
tive power in general. Outside the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court is highly skeptical of the executive branch de-
fining its own powers.258 Allowing law enforcement to deter-
mine what powers it may exercise in the absence of constitu-
tional or legislative authorization effectively grants the officer
on the street or the chief of police greater power than the Chief
Executive.
In addition to being the proper constitutional body to de-
cide these questions, legislatures are institutionally more com-
petent than courts to make the types of policy decisions associ-
ated with authorizing government surveillance. Because they
are politically accountable, they are more likely to evaluate the
policy implications of certain surveillance technologies, balanc-
ing, among other things, the threat to privacy and potential for
abuse against the needs of law enforcement and the interests of
public safety considering the interest of the public in general.
They are also better able to develop a factual record with re-
spect to the nuances and details of new technologies and their
costs and benefits. Moreover, whatever one might think of the
legislative process, it is more likely to take the interests of the
general public into account in fashioning rules governing sur-
veillance than courts who are asked to make such decisions in
cases in which a search revealed evidence of a defendant's guilt
and the only remedy is exclusion of that evidence.
Of course, allowing legislatures to determine government's
258. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88
(1952).
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power to search raises concerns about abuse or unresponsive
legislative power. Admittedly, strict adherence to the warrant
requirement avoids this problem by denying legislatures any
power to deviate from the Warrant Clause.259 Concerns about
legislative abuse, however, should be alleviated by judicial re-
view of these legislative determinations with the Warrant
Clause as the guide. As the Supreme Court has done in the
context of administrative searches, it should review statutory
grants of power to determine whether the procedures adopted
by legislatures are "constitutionally adequate substitute [s] for a
warrant."260 Using the Warrant Clause as the touchstone for
evaluating statutory safeguards would limit deviations from
the amendment's stated safeguards while ensuring that the
legislation limited arbitrary and abusive searches. 261 Judicial
review under these circumstances would return the judiciary to
its traditional constitutional role of evaluating such judgments
against a backdrop of constitutional principles and norms
rather than allowing judges to sit as policymakers themselves.
Ultimately, however, the majoritarian concern goes directly to
the larger question of whether reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment should be expanded beyond the warrant
requirement at all.
Could Congress or a state legislature satisfy the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonableness by simply passing a
law authorizing law enforcement to adopt and use any technol-
ogy it chooses? Assuming that a legislature would pass such a
statute, a highly dubious proposition, the answer must be no.
While such a statute might satisfy the doctrine of separation of
powers, it does nothing to address the concerns embodied in the
259. Of course, one may argue that the tyranny of contemporary majorities
is simply replaced by the tyranny of past majorities.
260. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603.
261. Of course, the legislation should be subject to review in light of other
constitutional concerns including equal protection. As one author has noted,
The warrant requirement injects the judgment of a "neutral and de-
tached" magistrate and also has what may be the more important ef-
fect of compelling a contemporaneous recordation of the factors on
whose basis the action is being taken. The probable cause require-
ment obviously can't guarantee a lack of arbitrariness: invidious
choices among those respecting whom there is probable cause are pos-
sible. By setting a substantive parameter at one end of the decision,
however, it at least requires that persons not be singled out for arrest
or search in the absence of strong indication of guilt, that is, on the
basis of constitutionally irrelevant factors alone.
ELY, supra note 19, at 172-73.
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Fourth Amendment. Such a statute does nothing to limit police
discretion at either the macro or micro level.262 While legisla-
tures may delegate broad discretionary powers to the executive
branch in other areas of constitutional law, the Fourth
Amendment would appear to limit such a delegation with re-
spect to searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the proper scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment in general, and its relationship with information gather-
ing technologies in particular, constitutes a debate over the
proper distribution of power in our constitutional government.
Who determines what technologies may be used to gather in-
formation about individuals and the public in general? In other
words, who determines just how much security the people may
enjoy? For more than a quarter of a century this decision was
made occasionally by judges, but more often by law enforce-
ment engaged in the surveillance. Not only has this permitted
technology to erode individual privacy, but it is contrary to the
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting the
amendment, the Framers of our Constitution were primarily
concerned with limiting government power and discretion, and
like all governmental power, the decision of how much surveil-
lance power the government should have was left to the people.
In debating over how to define privacy, the courts have ignored
these concerns for far too long.
This Article has argued that the Fourth Amendment can-
not be viewed in isolation, but must be seen as a complement to
other constitutional protections including the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers. The Fourth Amendment and the definition of
executive power in our constitutional separation of powers pro-
tect the public from arbitrary and unrestrained executive
power. The need for this interpretation becomes clear when we
recognize that certain decisions made by law enforcement are
more than simply discretionary decisions about when to search
a particular individual, but rather macro level decisions that
determine the extent of their own powers and correspondingly
the amount of privacy the public may enjoy. Accordingly, I
262. This conclusion would also appear consistent with the colonial re-
sponse to the writs of assistance, which were condemned even though they
were authorized by acts of parliament. See supra Part I.A. See generally
SMITH, supra note 34 (discussing the colonial controversy surrounding the
writs of assistance).
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have argued that the Fourth Amendment requires that
searches conducted with new surveillance technologies must be
treated as searches subject to Fourth Amendment restraints.
Technologically assisted searches must either comply with the
Warrant Clause or be authorized by a statute containing safe-
guards that are constitutionally adequate substitutes for a
warrant. While this Article has focused on law enforcement de-
cisions to adopt new surveillance technologies, the concerns it
raises about existing Fourth Amendment law are not limited to
technology. Law enforcement decisions to use undercover
agents, helicopters, or automatic weapons in combating crime
are all decisions that determine the scope of executive power
and the level of privacy and security the public may enjoy. To
the extent that the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment in such a way that it no longer serves as a check
against arbitrary government decisionmaking in these areas as
well, the constitutional questions are equally troubling. It may
be expedient or more efficient to leave certain decisions to the
executive branch rather than subject them to the limits im-
posed by the Constitution or to require legislative authorization
and safeguarding, especially in times of crises. Our Constitu-
tion, however, was not adopted to promote efficiency but to pre-
serve liberty, and there is no more important means of preserv-
ing individual liberty than prohibiting the exercise of arbitrary
power. While these institutions and principles may be destined
to pass away, "it is the duty of the Court to be [the] last, not
[the] first to give them up."263
263. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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